

DRAFT REPORT

**Evaluation of ZOE's Emergency Relief Project 2008
(Feeding and agricultural inputs)**

An evaluation carried out by Nick Burn

November 2008

- **Executive Summary**

Background

Zimbabwe's continued economic and political crisis coupled with a succession of poor harvests, left an estimated 4 million people in need of food aid in 2007/8. Zimbabwe's economy has moved ever closer towards total collapse with the highest inflation rate in the world and chronic shortages of even basic foodstuffs. Due to a combination of factors including high levels of HIV, the failure of the health and other services, Zimbabwe now has the lowest life expectancy and the highest number of orphans per capita in the world.

ZOE has been mobilising local churches to care for orphans for over a decade and have trained about 3500 volunteers throughout the country. Currently about 70,000 orphans receive a regular visit from a volunteer.

ZOE has carried out emergency feeding in 2003-2004 and 2006. Previous evaluations have highlighted the ongoing chronic food insecurity of many of these families.

Description of programme

Against this growing crisis ZOE undertook an emergency feeding programme from January 2008 to provide a monthly general ration to about 7,000 families (35,000 beneficiaries) within their church based orphan care programme. Distributions were carried out by local churches in over 70 locations throughout Zimbabwe using 5 warehouses to store food. A Coordinator was appointed at each site and trained to manage the process, manage paperwork and be the contact person with the ZOE office.

A small seed and fertiliser distribution was also carried out benefiting 480 families

Context.

The relief programme took place during a time of political tension and violence that accompanied closely contested elections at the end of March and a run-off for the Presidency in June. A ban was imposed on the activities of NGO's during this time and access into many rural areas became impossible because of risks to ZOE staff and local church members. The food situation became even more critical as it was used as a political weapon to influence voting. ZOE was able to continue some distributions but the programme was highly disrupted and monitoring and supervision was curtailed.

Findings

Effectiveness

The feeding programme succeeded in achieving its purpose of protecting 7,000 vulnerable families from the negative effects of the food crisis in Zimbabwe for at least 6 months by providing a basket of food to about 35,000 people. However, distributions were not timely and the period of feeding had to be extended to over 9 months. Distributions were delayed mainly due to the political situation but also some supply and transport problems. This meant significant interruptions to the food supply, but ZOE mitigated this situation to some extent by delivering two months rations at one time in many areas.

Beneficiaries were able to eat at least two meals per day while rations lasted and the targeting of the most vulnerable (U5's and sick) with nutritious Corn Soya Blend (CSB) was successful. The fact that the food often didn't last the full month was in part due to the practice of sharing rations with other families that were not registered. This practice was not uncommon, particularly in urban and peri-urban Bulawayo.

The seed and fertiliser programme was not effective – beneficiaries did not receive inputs by the optimum planting date (26 November) although all that did receive them planted. Not all the fertiliser was received in time for distribution so was held over for a year.

Impact

Numerous testimonies confirmed the significant impact that the feeding programme had on the beneficiaries. These included improved health, (better nutrition, resistance to and recovery from illness, adherence to HIV treatment; reduced stress – particularly for child headed households); protection of access to education (money spent on food could be used for fees) and improved performance (more regular attendance and better concentration). People's dignity was protected as they were not so reliant on begging from others and in some cases families were able to keep together rather than migrate to look for work.

There was no impact of the distribution of seeds and fertiliser. The lack of harvest was principally due to poor rains but was also affected by the late distribution of the inputs.

Efficiency

The procurement, warehousing and stock control systems were adequate born out by the fact that as far as could be ascertained, no major losses occurred and the correct amounts were delivered to the sites. However, many of the recommendations from a consultants visit to improve the logistics had not been fully implemented and significant weaknesses remain in the supervision and monitoring of the warehouses and in the collection, storage and analysis of data.

The lack of supervision and monitoring was partly caused by the political unrest and the lack of transport. However, a fundamental issue was that the Programmes Manager's workload remained excessive and coordination among staff lacking.

Distributions were also carried out with reasonable efficiency which given the situation was a real achievement. There were significant areas where standards in distribution could be improved particularly in the selection of beneficiaries, distances people had to travel to collect food, transparency of the system and accountability of some Coordinators

Lack of clarity on roles and lines of reporting was an important factor that reduced efficiency within the team. The M&E team have made good steps in gathering information and promoting accountability, but need a clearer mandate and structure within the organisation to maximise their effectiveness.

Underlying all these is the need to strengthen management practice generally.

Recommendations

First priority has been given to addressing management issues in the wider organisation as well as the relief programme – there are fundamental issues ZOE needs to address in order to be a healthy organisation and it is recommended that these principles are applied all of ZOE's programmes. Recruiting a General Manager will be key to this.

Second priority has been given to measures that will improve standards in distribution and accountability since this was where the greatest risk appears to lie and where there will be an immediate impact on the dignity and protection of vulnerable orphans and their families. These particularly relate to the role and approach of the Coordinators and volunteers who have the strongest influence on the quality of service given to the beneficiaries. Extending beneficiary accountability will be the most effective way to improve standards

Third priority has been given to improving the logistical systems – there are a number of recommendations outstanding from Nick Parham's report and these should be followed up to ensure tighter accountability in warehousing and stock management.

- **Contents**

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Executive Summary | 1 |
| Contents | 3 |
| Introduction/Background | 4 |
| Methodology | 5 |
| Context Analysis | 6 |
| Findings, Conclusions, Assessment | 7 |
| 1. Effectiveness | 7 |
| 1.1 Output 1 | 7 |
| 1.1.1 Assessment Output 1 | 10 |
| 1.2 Output 2 | 13 |
| 1.2.1 Assessment Output 2 | 13 |
| 1.3 Purpose | 14 |
| 1.4 Goal | 15 |
| 1.5 Was the project within budget? | 15 |
| 1.6 Summary – Effectiveness | 15 |
| 2. Impact | 16 |
| 2.1 Findings | 16 |
| 2.2 Conclusions and Assessment | 16 |
| 3. Efficiency | 17 |
| 3.1 Procurement system | 18 |
| 3.2 Warehousing and stock control system | 19 |
| 3.2.1 Findings | 19 |
| 3.2.2 Conclusions | 20 |
| 3.2.3 Assessment | 22 |
| 3.3 Distribution System | 22 |
| 3.3.1 Findings and assessment | 22 |
| 3.4 Monitoring and evaluation system | 23 |
| 3.5 Adherence to standards of good practice | 24 |
| 3.5.1 Findings | 24 |
| 3.5.2 Conclusions | 25 |
| 3.6 Coordination with other agencies | 26 |
| 3.7 Cooperation with River of Life | 26 |
| 4. Major factors Influencing the efficiency of the project and increasing risk | 28 |
| 4.1 General management practice | 28 |
| 4.1.1 Findings | 28 |
| 4.1.2 Other management issues | 29 |
| 4.2 Pastors in Coordinators role | 30 |

| | |
|---|-----------|
| 4.3 Training Coordinators and volunteers | 31 |
| 5. Recommendations | 32 |
| 5.1 Recommendations on management | 32 |
| 5.2 Recommendations on standards and accountability | 33 |
| 5.3 Recommendations on procurement, warehousing, stock control systems | 33 |
| 5.4 Recommendations on ZOE's continued involvement in relief feeding | 34 |
| 5.5 Recommendations to Tearfund, Tear NL and Tearfund Switzerland | 35 |
| | |
| Appendices | |
| 1. Terms of reference | 36 |
| 2. Schedule for ZOE Feeding Programme evaluation | 39 |
| 3. List of documents consulted during the Evaluation | 41 |
| 4. Persons participating in and consulted during Evaluation | 41 |
| 5. Master list of Goods released (Reconciliation Goods released and distributed) | 42 |
| 6. Notes on review of logframe | 43 |

Introduction / Background

Zimbabwe has experienced a steady economic decline for the last 7 years due to a combination of poor governance, drought and HIV. Zimbabwe now has the lowest life expectancy, the highest unemployment rate, the highest inflation rate and the greatest number of orphans per capita in the world. Hyper-inflation is fuelled by the government's policy of printing money to purchase foreign currency, which has crippled the economy, sent many companies out of business and drastically increased unemployment. Several million people have left Zimbabwe to look for work in neighbouring countries..

Most commodities are in short supply particularly food and fuel. Grain is controlled by the Grain Marketing Board much of which is marketed by ZANU-PF party card holders within a system of patronage. Hospitals, schools and other public services are barely functioning with many civil servants being forced to find alternative work due to salaries that don't keep up with inflation. Opposition is repressed by the police and army, often violently, under a range of draconian laws.

Food insecurity is endemic with a joint FAO/WFP assessment indicating that up to 4 million people would need food aid in the period up to the harvest in April 2008. WFP had committed to respond but were anticipating a shortfall and were appealing for others to engage. In the event, lack of fertiliser and seed as well as a combination of flooding followed by inadequate rainfall resulted in another poor harvest in April. This meant that many families continued to be dependant on food aid. In addition, a large number of families have limited capacity to produce food even if they had inputs.

With the support of Tearfund, Tear Netherlands and Tearfund Switzerland, ZOE implemented a 6 month feeding programme between January and October 2008. The target beneficiaries were about 7000 most vulnerable orphan households supported by local church volunteers who have been trained by ZOE. These families were selected on the basis that they are child headed or households headed by elderly or sick guardians with limited assets and income. These households were already experiencing a severe impact of the food shortages including removal of children from school, sale of assets, interruption of ARV medication and malnutrition leading to high risk of increased mortality.

The project aimed to feed a total of 35,000 people in these vulnerable orphan households and the volunteers who visit them. Each person in the household was entitled to a monthly ration per person was 10 Kg maize, 2Kg beans, 750 ml oil, 2Kg CSB.

Lists of beneficiaries were drawn up by the Coordinators with the help of the ZOE volunteers and church leaders. Selection criteria were: child headed households, households headed by an elderly or chronically ill carer. Households would not qualify if they received a regular monthly income of more than Z\$10 million, and in the case of rural households if they had more than 4 goats

ZOE decided that food would be distributed between the different sites in the following proportions (approximately):

- Bulawayo (urban and rural) 60% 21,000 beneficiaries
- Harare (urban and rural) 16% 5,600
- Nkayi, Hwange, Gwanda – each 8% 8,400 (2,800 each site)

Coordinators were briefed and given a refresher trained at the Coordinators workshop in November 2007. This training included methods for distribution and reporting, a reminder of the Red Cross Code of Conduct and Sphere standards as well as an update on the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) and the results of the pilot carried out in 2006/7.

Coordinators were then delegated to draw up the beneficiary lists to include names, identity no and the number of rations they were entitled to according to the number of family members

Distributions were carried out at more than 70 sites around the country. The smaller warehouses served about 10 sites each while Harare distributed to 15 sites and Bulawayo to the remaining 25. In addition, individual churches in Harare and Bulawayo would collect food directly from the warehouses using their own transport.

Responsibility for distribution lay with the site Coordinator who at most sites was supported by an area committee comprised of different church coordinators. A Distribution Supervisor, based at the warehouse would accompany the truck to assist the Coordinator with the distribution.

The Coordinator was responsible for drawing up the beneficiary list, passing on information about the programme, training volunteers and managing or overseeing the distribution. This included ensuring the distribution form (F2 form) was accurately completed with beneficiary name, identity number, number of people in the family, amount of food received per beneficiary, beneficiary signature, total of each food item distributed.

In addition the project aimed to provide seed and fertiliser to 480 rural households within the group receiving food aid. The intention had been to recruit a FGW Coordinator to train and support the families but late recruitment meant that he could only help beneficiaries to prepare for the next year.

Recommendations from the evaluation of the 2005 feeding programme carried out by Ruvimbo Chimedza were reviewed. They are summarised as follows:

- There is an ongoing need for relief feeding given the chronic food insecurity situation and high levels of vulnerability of orphan households
- Strengthen the monitoring function by increasing the number of staff
- The role of day to day coordination would better not be done by pastors in view of their other responsibilities
- Pastors and coordinators should set up governance structures to better monitor distributions and empower pastors through a more inclusive approach
- Clear written guidelines for the relief process are needed to help standardise selection of beneficiaries and food rations allocated
- Volunteers should not receive a ration as normal beneficiaries since this gives rise to a conflict of interests
- The selection procedure should be tightened and selection closely monitored
- ZOE should explore ways of promoting initiatives such as local reserves, that build local capacity to be more self reliant

- **Methodology**

The schedule of the visit is shown in Appendix 2

Discussions with staff: Q Khumalo (Programmes Manager), T Nkiwane, Nosisa (M&E Officers), Max (Data Capture Officer):

- Timeline exercise to provide an overview of the implementation of the project and highlight the successes, challenges as well as the key events and issues that affected the implementation.
- Review of log frame using problem tree to clarify hierarchy of objectives, indicators and risks
- Review of organogram for relief programme and review of job descriptions
- Review of achievement of objectives (effectiveness)
- Review of systems (efficiency)

Discussions with the Directors to understand policy and management practice

Discussions with other staff (Accountant, Farming Gods Way Coordinator, Harare Coordinator)

The efficiency of the warehousing and stock control systems were also assessed during visits to 2 warehouses and interviews with four Warehouse Supervisors

The effectiveness, impact and efficiency of the programme was also assessed during individual and focus group meetings with Coordinators and volunteers and in interviews with individual beneficiaries in their homes

In addition, an analysis was done of relief documentation including procurement records and distribution records

The monitoring plan was reviewed and discussions held with the M&E officer

- **Context Analysis**

The period of implementation of the project was marked by a very high degree of political instability and violence. Combined Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held at the end of March. There were numerous attempts to influence the results in the run up to the elections which led observers to note that the elections could never be considered free and fair. While voting on the day went off peacefully, ZANU-PF quickly realised that it had not won a majority in Parliament and had in fact lost the Presidential election by a narrow majority. Tensions quickly rose while ZANU slowly declared the results and prepared for a run-off for the Presidential context. This preparation involved unleashing a wave of violence on opposition MDC supporters and sympathisers using the so called War Veterans and other youth militia. During April and May upwards of 100 people were killed, many were severely injured and lost houses and other properties. Food was closely controlled as part of the strategy to persuade voters to vote the 'right way'.

The government accused the NGO's of supporting the opposition and effectively 'buying' their votes through their work. NGO's were restricted and then banned from operating – effectively shutting them down for several months from April to August. The church continued to work despite accusations that it was supporting the opposition MDC. However, some distributions and monitoring visits became impossible in many areas as the presence of outsiders would draw unwelcome attention and mark people out for violence. However, this was highly variable and some distributions continued.

Just prior to the run-off for the Presidential election violence intensified, until MDC withdrew. By July tensions had calmed as the government called off the militia. The ban on NGO's was lifted and distributions and visits were able to resume without restriction.

Due to the unrest and violence, the distribution programme was seriously disrupted.

The working environment in Zimbabwe has been very challenging. There are shortages of most commodities including cash. Fuel can be obtained with coupons, but electricity is frequently cut and telephone communications are poor. The hyper inflation makes budgeting very difficult – even in US\$ terms inflation has been very high (40%?) over the period of the project.

- **Findings, Conclusions and Assessment**

1. Effectiveness – has the project achieved its objectives?

The log frame was reviewed to give greater clarity in assessing whether the objectives were achieved. This was done with ZOE staff from the Bulawayo office directly involved in the relief project by drawing a problem tree. However, the discussions weren't concluded at that time but the evaluator made some slight changes at a later stage. An explanation of these is given in Appendix 6.

Goal: Improved quality of life for up to 15,000 orphans and their families

Purpose: 7,000 vulnerable orphan households are protected from the negative impacts of the food crisis in Zimbabwe for 6 months.

Indicators: Improved health among targeted families
< 2% children report having missed school in last month due to hunger
Families receiving agricultural inputs harvest enough food to last 12 months

Output 1: 35,000 vulnerable people (orphans, their families and carers) have timely access to food that provides an adequate daily diet during the period January to July 2008

Indicators: 35,000 beneficiaries receive the full allocated ration on time each month
Beneficiary families eat at least 2 balanced meals per day (include starch, protein and fat)
U5's and the chronically ill are regularly eating CSB in at least 70% of benefiting families

Output 2: 480 orphan families are able to plant sufficient staple crops to cover their annual needs using appropriate methods

Indicators: Families receive the targeted amount of seed and fertiliser by the optimum planting date
Families plant at least 3 acres of staple food crops using the FGW approach

1.1 Output 1: 35,000 vulnerable people (orphans, their families and carers) have timely access to food that provides an adequate daily diet during the period January to July 2008

Indicator 1 - 35,000 people receive the full allocated ration, on time each month

a) How many people received food? No analysis of the distribution forms (F2 forms) was available to confirm the total number of beneficiaries who had received food. Although much of this information was entered on to a computer database, it had not been completed. The only way to estimate the number of beneficiaries was from the quantity of food released from the warehouses - assuming that each beneficiary received the planned ration each month for 6 months and that all the food distributed reached the beneficiaries.

The programme manager maintained a spreadsheet (Master List of Goods Released' (Appendix 5)) to track the food released, based on the WHS monthly reports (table 1).

Table 1. Food released from warehouses for distribution

| Warehouse | Maize (tonne) | Beans (tonne) | Veg oil (litre) | CSB (tonne) |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Bulawayo | 1,142 | 249 | 62,938 | 211 |
| Harare | 324 | 56 | 23,374 | 58 |
| Hwange | 176 | 35 | 12,899 | 35 |
| Nkayi | 210 | 40 | 13,783 | 48 |
| Gwanda | 193 | 39 | 13,731 | 37 |
| Total | 2,045 | 419 | 126,724 | 389 |
| Total planned | 2,100 | 420 | 157,500 | 420 |
| Difference | 55 | 1 | 30,776 | 31 |
| % Difference | 2.6 | 0.3 | 19.5 | 7.4 |

From this, the number of beneficiaries can be estimated:

Table 2. Estimation of No of beneficiaries

| | Maize (tonne) | Beans (tonne) | Veg oil (litre) | CSB (tonne) |
|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Amount/beneficiary/distribn | 0.010 | 0.002 | 0.750 | 0.002 |
| No distributions | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Total given/beneficiary | 0.06 | 0.01 | 4.5 | 0.01 |
| Total distributed (from Tab 1) | 2045 | 419 | 126725 | 389 |
| Total no beneficiaries | 34083.33 | 34917 | 28161 | 32417 |

Table 2. indicates that enough food was released for over 34,000 people to receive a 10kg ration of maize every month for six months. The lower numbers for CSB reflects stocks remaining in the Bulawayo store that will be distributed as soon as an outstanding balance of maize is received from the supplier. The lower amount of oil represents a shortfall not supplied by V&N and one incidence of theft.

However, the following were noted:

The Waybills for the distribution were not systematically collected and filed at the office. When matched with the distribution forms, these provide the ‘proof’ that the food has been properly used. However, about 20-30% of the waybills and more of the distribution forms had not all been returned to the office so a proper reconciliation cannot be made.

Having said this, there was no evidence of major misuse or loss of food apart from a theft of 4044 litres of oil from the Bulawayo warehouse which occurred in June when a door was forced. A security alarm was subsequently installed.

b) Was the full ration given?

ZOE communicated clearly to the Coordinators at the training that they should follow the allocated ration. This was designed to provide adequate nutrition for each person for a month covering the daily requirement of 2,100 kcals, with protein and fat providing 10-12% and 17% of total energy respectively (Sphere standards). On each waybill leaving the warehouse, the amount to be given per person was clearly written.

However, discussions with Coordinators, volunteers and the M&E team revealed that at a significant number of sites the ration was reduced. Coordinators and volunteers interviewed at 3 urban sites in Bulawayo were quite open about the fact that they did this so that more families could benefit.

Exit surveys by the M&E Officer (at 15 sites) also showed that on several occasions, the Coordinator and Distribution Supervisor reduced the size of the ration. In one case where two months rations were being delivered at one time, they were given to two different groups of people. An review of Distribution (F2) forms revealed some cases where beneficiaries were getting similar rations regardless of the number of members in the family

In Bulawayo, the reason the Coordinators gave for reducing a family's ration was the sheer number of people in desperate need of food. Pastors are under pressure since their churches have many more orphan families on their lists than they had been allocated food for. There was no evidence that reducing rations was done with dishonest intentions - those interviewed said that they had discussed and agreed reducing the ration with the beneficiary families although most distribution forms were signed by the beneficiary as if they were receiving the full ration. However, this practice undermines the system of accountability and leaves Coordinators and others open to temptation to misuse resources.

Although it is impossible to say how widespread this practice was, it was acknowledged to take place in the rural areas in the north. Possibly as many as one quarter of beneficiaries were affected as the practice was widespread in Bulawayo town where a high number of beneficiaries were located.

The only positive aspect was that reducing the ration did give flexibility to add to the list those in great need, without removing someone else from the list.

c) Were the distributions timely?

The timeliness of distributions varied greatly and was one of the principle challenges ZOE faced. Distributions started late – most by the end of January – a month after the first consignment of food had been received because the 8 tonne trucks only arrived in January.

At some sites gaps between distributions could be as long as 4 months although analysis of five sites at Gwanda showed an average delay of about 10 days based on a starting date of 31 January. There was a significant difference between the rural and urban areas. In towns such as Bulawayo and Gwanda the timeliness was much better, since movement was not restricted and in some cases, urban beneficiaries received food virtually every month.

ZOE quickly adopted the practice of giving 2 months rations at a time to catch up to the backlog. However, the delays meant that distributions continued into September with several sites reported that they were still expecting a final delivery in November.

There were several reasons for the delays:

i) Political violence greatly affected the free movement of food and people. However, this varied greatly and in some places Coordinators were able to get agreement from the War Veterans and local authorities to continue distributions. In towns, the violence was less of a problem.

ii) Supply chain problems.

a) The original supplier (V&N) failed to fulfil their contract to supply all the food items on time and delayed to supply CSB until March. In February the contract with V&N was ended when a consignment of 3 trucks of maize was found to be unfit for consumption. A contract was then signed with Afrilink.

b) Transport

The first consignments of food were received in mid December 07 before the two 8-tonne trucks had been received. Although a 3.5 tonne truck was operating, the distribution schedule was affected by up to a month.

Distributions from the Harare warehouse were particularly affected by transport shortages. The T35 was used in place of one of the 8 tonne trucks when it was involved in an accident. With decisions made at short notice due the difficulty of getting information on whether it was safe to travel, it was impossible to maintain to a pre-planned schedule.

Remarkably, there were no cases of trucks being turned back at the many roadblocks and no food was ever lost. This was due to a lot of prayer, and also to the care taken to get permission from the local authorities or War Veterans who were manning roadblocks or to find out if it was safe to enter an area.

One specific threat by War Veterans in Gwanda to burn a truck was averted when the driver (unaware of the threat) changed the schedule to do a distribution in another area that afternoon.

Output 1, Indicator 2: Beneficiary families eat at least 2 balanced meals per day

Findings:

Of the beneficiaries interviewed almost all confirmed that the food they had received had enabled them to eat at least 2 meals per day. Some of the stories of impact showed that the food had considerably increased household consumption and met a real need. The one respondent who was on ARV's confirmed that it had enabled him to continue treatment and that he (and a sick child) had gained significant weight.

However, half of those interviewed said that the food didn't last the whole month – commonly not more than 3 weeks. There were a number of reasons for this. 5 out of 13 interviewees didn't get the full ration at distribution, according to the number of mouths to feed in their family. It is also clear that in the prevailing situation where so many people were desperate to find food, many families informally shared their food with neighbours. In town, people had financial commitments – particularly to pay rent – and sale of a portion of the food was a necessary option for some of the most vulnerable.

Output 1, Indicator 3: Did U5's and the chronically ill regularly eat CSB in at least 70% of benefiting families?

Findings:

Almost all respondents said that all members of the family ate the 'porridge' – including the chronically ill and U5's. One claimed that it was reserved for the children alone. However, it was impossible to gauge the accuracy of these responses and it is unlikely that if they were not receiving it, family members would be open about it. However, over the course of the year, M&E staff had been able to verify from interviews with children themselves that they were eating the porridge although no quantitative values are available.

All respondents said that this was a very welcome and valuable addition to the food basket – even to the extent that in one place it was given a special local name

1.1.1 Assessment Output 1

Although, there was insufficient documentation to verify the exact number of beneficiaries that actually received food, in the evaluators view, at least 35,000 people did benefit from two balanced meals per day for a significant proportion of the programme period. Evidence showed that the most vulnerable (children and the sick) enjoyed the nutritional benefits of CSB, as planned.

The supply of food was however irregular in most places and significant gaps did occur as distributions were disrupted by political violence, transport and the failure of one supplier to fulfil their contract on time – issues which ZOE had limited control over. ZOE did adapt the system to deliver two months at a time which helped to reduce delays. Timeliness of the

distributions will have caused some hardship for families expecting food as they were forced to look for alternatives. However, given the continued need for food throughout the programme period, when it arrived, it always met a real need.

It was not possible to say whether ZOE would have managed timely distributions if conditions had been 'normal' although operating in Zimbabwe are always very challenging with shortages of fuel, communications difficulties and daily power cuts. There are important management issues that suggest improvements to efficiency could have been made and these are discussed below. However, the courage and determination of the ZOE staff and pastors should be acknowledged as they continued to operate at times when all other agencies had been forced to stop – at some personal risk.

Reduction of the monthly ration by the Coordinators and volunteers at distribution was common practice and needs to be rectified. If the most vulnerable families are being selected, then by definition, they are the ones that have the fewest alternative coping strategies and will be the most susceptible to the effects of gaps in their diet. In addition, informal pressure to share rations in a situation where so many families lack food, meant that even a full ration might not provide all a families needs. Reducing the ration also undermines accountability and opens leaders to the temptation to misuse food.

The challenge of getting the right amount of food to the most needy beneficiaries spread in over 70 sites around the country, in a timely manner would present a huge challenge at the best of times. The fact that the feeding programme coincided with a period of national unrest, made the task even harder.

Should volunteers receive rations?

The proposal included the 3,500 Coordinators and volunteers to receive a ration by right, so that this would not compromise the allocation of vulnerable beneficiaries (see recommendation from the 2006 evaluation (Ruvimbo Mabeza-Chimedza)) However, nowhere did the evaluator find a volunteer say they were receiving this ration unless they were caring for an orphan. Most didn't know they were entitled to it. ZOE staff felt it wasn't appropriate for those in town and estimated that less than 50% of the volunteers actually received rations.

Some volunteers requested that they be included in future – at least to receive a single ration. However, most agreed that it would not be right to take food from the very vulnerable, so that if additional food was not available, they would prefer not to get it.

1.2 Output 2: 480 orphan families are able to plant sufficient staple crops to cover their annual needs using appropriate methods

Seed and part of the fertiliser were distributed in December to about 480 families. The majority of the beneficiary families were in the north where there is greater production potential.

Output 2 Indicator 1 Families receive the targeted amount of seed and fertiliser by the optimum planting date

Families did not get the inputs to plant by the optimum planting date. Six of the 13 beneficiaries interviewed confirmed they had received farming inputs in December (5 persons) or January (1) so had planted about a month after the optimum date.

Not all the fertiliser was distributed as it was received too late. Two beneficiaries (in the same area) said they had received fertiliser but no seed.

All commented that inputs had been too late to have a chance of a good harvest (even if the rainfall had been adequate).

The decision to distribute agricultural inputs was taken by ZOE after consultation with the Coordinators at a conference in November 2007. The Coordinators took the view that it was worth doing as at that time, the optimum planting date was still a week ahead. However, It was therefore well into December when distributions took place. A very wet period at the beginning of January (which caused localised flooding and killed or severely set back some crops) was followed by a long dry spell.

Indicator 2 - Families plant at least 3 acres of staple food crops using the FGW approach

It was not possible to objectively verify the amount of land planted given the time of year and the difficulties of estimating the size of fields. However, all the beneficiaries interviewed said they had planted their seed and almost all used CF or FGW methods.

1.2.1 Assessment – Output 2:

Although the approach of helping people to grow their food is preferable to food distributions for many reasons, it was in hindsight, a mistake to try to procure and distribute agricultural inputs at such a late stage. With the time needed to go through the process of competitive bidding, the general difficulties of getting hold of inputs in Zimbabwe and the complications due to operating in a hyper inflationary environment, procurement took almost a month. If planting had been done a month earlier, it is likely that some harvest would have been achieved although not enough to provide food security for the year.

The fact that all beneficiaries did use the CF/FGW approach shows that the training that ZOE (with the support of River of Life) has given over the last few years, has had some impact. However, ZOE did not have the capacity at that time to monitor the selection of beneficiaries or support them to ensure that they were able to follow FGW accurately.

However, the government's monopoly on marketing grain and the experience of many individuals of being forced to sell their crops at uneconomic prices (and in some cases without receiving the promised payment), presents a real risk that the aim of promoting food security would not be achieved even if a family realised a significant harvest.

1.3 Purpose: 7,000 vulnerable orphan households families are protected from the negative effects of the food crisis in Zimbabwe for at least 6 months.

Indicator 1 – Improved health among targeted families.

Without a definitive baseline survey and an in depth study, it is not possible to quantify improvements in health. However, beneficiary accounts confirmed that the feeding programme did significantly improve health (see Impact section) at a time of severe national food shortages and economic crisis. Many households had very limited protein in their diets and a maximum of one meal per day, so two balanced meals per day had a significant impact. The M&E team also recorded cases of reduced levels of opportunistic infections among those who were HIV+ and cases of increased CD4 cell count.

The benefit to health was undoubtedly lessened by delays between distributions and the sharing of rations, which meant that for many people they faced gaps of weeks in which they had to resort to other coping mechanisms. In one reported case, a difficult decision was taken that an adult on ARV's would eat in preference to children.

Indicator 2 - <2% children report having missed school due to hunger

This was partly achieved. While the benefit could not be accurately quantified during the evaluation and responses were not systematic, eight out of thirteen beneficiary families interviewed confirmed that the food had enabled their children to remain in school. An M&E team survey had measured about 8% who had missed school because of hunger. Beneficiaries reported that in the absence of hunger they were 'happy to go to school' and could concentrate. Scarce financial resources could be used to pay school fees rather than buy food.

During the interviews however, several beneficiaries reported that the schools were no longer functioning because teachers were not working. Some also cited lack of school fees as the reason why their children were not currently attending.

Indicator 3 - Families receiving agricultural inputs harvest enough food to last 12 months

This was not achieved

1.3.1 Purpose assessment – were vulnerable families protected from the negative effects of the food crisis?

Information gathered by the M&E team and interviews with beneficiaries and volunteers during the evaluation indicated strongly that at least 7000 orphan families had been protected to a significant extent from the negative effects of the food crisis. While the relief food did not provide 2 meals a day for all beneficiaries throughout the whole period, it was clear that the food had an important effect.

The distributions provided a vital lifeline, freeing up scarce financial resources that would be spent on food, to be used for other necessities. They also helped to restore some dignity by reducing the need to beg from neighbours and eased the psychological pressure of worrying how they would feed hungry children and other dependants. Almost all beneficiaries expressed their profound gratitude. Among the benefits reported were:

- Reduced incidences of sickness among children and sick adults
- Reduced stress levels for breadwinner
- Improved attendance and performance of children at school
- Children strong enough to be able to help with chores after school
- Able to take ARV medication

Due to the failure of the harvest and the continued shortages of food throughout the period of the relief operation, the issue of timeliness of distributions was in one sense less critical – whenever food was distributed it met an urgent need.

However, vulnerable beneficiaries will clearly come to depend on the monthly distribution and many will have been banking on them. When the food failed to come for an extended time, beneficiaries could potentially be more vulnerable than if they had had time to pursue another coping strategy.

The distribution of farming inputs failed to improve beneficiary's food security. No one interviewed harvested enough food to last for 12 months - rather they had either harvested nothing, or a very minimal amount. Beans and groundnuts had failed completely but two beneficiaries had harvested a small amount of maize (<50kg). The lack of yield was partly due to the late distribution of inputs but given the unfavourable weather conditions in 2007/8 it is very unlikely that the objective would not have been met even if the inputs had been distributed a month earlier.

1.4 Goal – Improved quality of life for up to 15,000 orphans and their families

The impact described in Section 2 gives some examples of how the project has made a significant contribution towards an improved quality of life

1.5 Was the project on budget?

The project was overspent by £4,700 (about 0.25%) up to 30 September but further expenses were incurred after this. The main difference was the higher price of the food when the new contract was signed with Afrilink. Although significant savings were made on transport, it wasn't sufficient to balance the budget.

1.6 Summary

Although food was not delivered on a monthly basis, ZOE has succeeded in delivering food to about 35,000 people over a period of about 9 months.

There is clear evidence that at least 7,000 vulnerable orphan families were protected to a significant degree from the negative effects of the food crisis and this made a significant contribution to the quality of life of orphans and their families.

While there were significant delays, it was real achievement to get food to people throughout the period of violence. ZOE staff should be commended for their commitment and hard work. The absence of evidence of theft or loss is also encouraging although the lack of a robust system to monitor deliveries might have hidden some irregularities.

There planned nutrition training did not happen because of the unrest.

The decision was taken to buy trucks (one 3.5 tonne and two 8 tonne) rather than try to hire them, as estimates showed it was going to be more cost effective and practical. It is certain that much greater delays would have occurred if ZOE had relied on hired transport – in fact it is unlikely that the programme could have been completed as hired drivers would not have been willing to enter sensitive areas and truck owners would not have risked their vehicles.

The seed and fertiliser programme did not meet its objectives – very little was harvested due to poor climatic conditions but affected also by very late delivery of the inputs.

2. Impact

While this evaluation did not aim to carry out an assessment of the impact of the food and seed distribution, testimonies and stories taken both from the M&E surveys and from interviews during the evaluation showed that there had been a significant impact during a very difficult time for vulnerable orphan families. All those involved from Coordinators through to the beneficiaries expressed their deep appreciation of the help received.

Background

A typical urban situation might be where orphans have been left with a sick parent or elderly grandparent after the parents have died from AIDS. Without any prospect of employment, they survive by renting out one or more rooms in the parents or grandparents house. This may provide a little money for food, electricity and water but often results in over-crowding. Orphans who are left without houses will have to find money each month to pay for rent. There are employment opportunities eg. selling on the street, but the income will be minimal. They can sometimes beg food from other families.

In the rural areas the cost of living is lower and there is no cost of rent and services. However, there are few if any employment opportunities and poverty is more widespread and neighbours are less able to help as they are struggling to survive themselves. Lack of inputs and poor rains have compounded their food insecurity

In these contexts people are often eating one meal per day, made with a relish of wild green leaves. At times they may have to forego a meal altogether. Weight loss is normal as is susceptibility to disease. For those who are HIV and on antiretrovirals, they will have to stop taking them until they can get a reasonable diet. Children are particularly susceptible and the youngest ones are at risk of dying.

2.1 Findings

The impact of feeding on such families is significant:

- Health improves as beneficiaries are able to eat 2 meals per day, with a source of protein and fat. Improved nutrition increases resistance to disease. HIV+ patients are able to start taking their drugs again and will gain weight. One beneficiary interviewed described how he and his son had both gained 30% in weight over the six months. Another TB patient believed he would not have survived without the food.
- Improved energy levels mean that children are happy and able to help with chores after school
- The emotional and psychological pressure of trying to find food for several hungry children is eased.
- A measure of dignity is restored as people are no longer obliged to beg.
- In some cases family break up due to migration to look for work is averted – the mutual support of siblings after a parents death can be vital
- Many stories show the impact on children's education. When there is insufficient food to eat, the little income goes on buying food and there is none left to pay school fees and costs. Not having to pay for food has meant for some, the small earnings are enough to keep the children in school.
- Many children have explained how they were not able to concentrate well before the food arrived or in some cases they didn't go to school at all. With the feeding programme, children's concentration and results have improved. One girl improved from 17 to 7th in her class because she could concentrate better. One father was even able to provide a small packed lunch of maize and beans for his son.
- Food has also protected assets that would otherwise have been sold – for example furniture and even clothes and shoes.
- The food increased time for productive activities since throughout the period of the programme, it was getting more difficult to source many types of food and looking for food for the next meal occupied a significant amount of time

2.2 Conclusions and Assessment

The impacts were similar to those noted in the evaluation of the 2007 relief programme and bear out the significant positive impact that the programme has had on many orphan families.

Unintended positive impact

The M&E Officer noted the following:

Growth of relationship between churches and local government services (health, social welfare, agriculture, etc.) as a result of its effective intervention

Increase in numbers of volunteers in churches who are active in social roles

Negative impact.

The question of whether ZOE's core programme has been weakened because of the feeding programme is debatable. All volunteers naturally point to the positive impact of the feeding and reported that it was extremely difficult for them to make a visit to a family suffering severe food shortage when they could not offer them any practical help. However, people did express concern that visits from volunteers were less frequent and only when there was food. A surprising number of beneficiaries said that they only received volunteer visits every month or two. This suggests it would be worth doing a study to better understand the dynamics of the core programme in the current environment and how the feeding programme (and other longer term interventions) has impacted on it.

The fact that ZOE staff and volunteers from the community have spent a considerable amount of time on the feeding programme means it is inevitable that other programmes will have had less attention – particularly the livelihoods programme managed by Qobolwakhe.

3. Efficiency

Efficiency relates to whether the project objectives were achieved in a timely and cost effective manner, using the human and physical resources in the most productive way.

The evaluation firstly reviewed the systems and processes that another consultant had recommended for procurement and warehousing/stock control.

The process for distribution was also reviewed. The distribution of food depended on a network of church leaders and volunteers spread over a wide geographical area whose efficient management was essential. Key areas would be training, communication and ongoing support.

Secondly it looked at wider systems of management within ZOE. ZOE's own team was been expanded with a stronger M&E team and support for data capture and analysis. The efficiency of its operation and management of staff and resources was assessed.

Background:

Nick Parham visited Zimbabwe in November 2007 to strengthen ZOE's logistical systems. As well as training ZOE staff in warehousing and stock control, he also carried out an assessment of the procurement and warehousing systems. Some of the weaknesses he found were due to lack of training and systems, but others were related to more general management issues.

The review of Nick Parham's report and recommendations formed the basis of the evaluation of the procurement and warehousing/stock control. For each area, a summary of his recommendations is presented in table form with a note to what extent they have been actioned.

In assessing the efficiency of the distribution system, interviews were held with Coordinators volunteers and beneficiaries as well as meetings with ZOE staff members.

3.1 Procurement system

The procurement system is as follows:

- Written call for offers to at least 3 suppliers – including specifications of the type of good required, their packaging, site of delivery, timing of delivery
- Quotations received
- Comparative Bid Analysis resulting in decision on supplier
- Order placed with delivery instructions
- Payment made (direct from Tearfund)

Possible interference from government in an activity as sensitive as feeding meant that ZOE could not make a call for offers through a public advertisement. Hence known suppliers were invited to submit quotes for the food and agricultural inputs.

In the current environment in Zimbabwe confidence in the suppliers ability to deliver the goods required on time was very important. Although V&N's price was the most competitive, they failed to supply as agreed and ZOE were forced to cancel their order in March and place the outstanding balance of the order with Afrilink.

Findings – Procurement system

Implementation of recommendations from Nick Parham's report:

| NP's findings | Findings of current evaluation |
|--|--|
| a All steps of the procurement process are completed on paper with the Purchase Request, Invitation to Tender and Purchase order including all details of the required goods and other details | Implemented: the written documentation was in the file and followed the prescribed system. |
| b A copy of all paperwork relating to procurements is filed (held by Finance or Logistics) | Implemented: file held by Logistics |
| c All documentation should be systematically filed so that it is readily available for checking. | Implemented: documents readily available |
| d Promise Manceda to ensure that the procurement compliance procedure is included in someone's Job Description. | NOT IMPLEMENTED |

Assessment: the procurement system was followed and the purchase of food was implemented efficiently despite the difficult environment and subsequent failure of one supplier. However, insufficient time was allowed for procurement of seed and fertiliser and its late delivery had a significant negative effect.

Note: While most recommendations regarding the procurement process were implemented for the 2008 programme, it seems they were not followed for the proposed programme for 2009 until the Tearfund DMO queried a submitted budget and asked for copies of the three tenders. The fact that a budget could be submitted to a donor without a competitive tendering process shows the importance of the compliance procedure.

3.2 Warehousing and Stock Control systems

ZOE operated 5 warehouses during the project to serve their surrounding areas. The main warehouse was in Bulawayo with other warehouses in Gwanda, Hwange, Nkayi and Harare. The suppliers were contracted to deliver the appropriate amount of food for each monthly distribution directly to each warehouse although some food was delivered by the ZOE trucks.

Nick Parham carried out a full review of the warehousing systems in November 07 and trained staff including the 5 warehouse supervisors (WHS). The following stock control system was established based on the Tearfund model

The following stock control system was in place:

Receipt of goods from supplier –

- Copy of supplier’s waybill received by WHS
- Goods Received forms (GRF) completed by WHS
- Sampling for quality and weight
- Bin card completed for stack
- Stock cards updated/disposal loss reports completed

Despatch of goods for distribution –

- Waybill (signed by authorised person), checked by WHS
- Bin and stock cards updated

Nick noted two main areas of weakness in stock control:

1. Essential records not being systematically filed or analysed
2. Inadequacies in management of the warehouses relating to lack of training, supervision or equipment

His recommendations can be summarised as follows:

- Data collection and monitoring - Someone in the office takes responsibility for receipt of forms from the warehouse, carrying out cross checks (all food ordered is received and all food received is distributed) and filing of records
- Warehouse management - All warehouses to be properly equipped and management systems followed with adequate supervision (Programme Manager (2x per month) and the Director (1x per month) to ensure adherence to procedures)

As the feeding programme had ended, only two of three warehouses were functioning at the time of the evaluation (Bulawayo and Harare). These were visited to assess how well they had functioned. Four of the five WHS’s were interviewed to assess their understanding of the systems and the effectiveness of their training. The WHS from Hwange was not interviewed as it was felt the cost and time of bringing her to Bulawayo was not justified.

3.2.1 Findings – warehousing/stock control

Visits to the warehouses and interviews with the WHS’s confirmed Nick Parham’s finding that the stock control process for receiving and releasing goods was being followed and the necessary forms were being used. Bin and stock cards were kept up to date and monthly stock report forms were completed.

A review of recommendations made by Nick Parham is shown below:

| | NP’s findings | Findings of current evaluation |
|-----------|---|--|
| a. | Data collection storage and analysis | |
| | Central filing of forms inadequate | Partly implemented – lever arch files had been set up. However, filing is not systematic and documents are difficult to find. Some files had been set up but were empty. |

| | | |
|-----------|---|--|
| | Cross checking inadequate | Partly implemented – a check had been made of goods received vs goods ordered which showed a balance outstanding. The supplier (Afrilink) had initially disputed this but then agreed when figures were checked. Reconciliation of goods received and good distributed was incomplete (not up to date) and there were errors in the data and in the calculations |
| | Some distribution lists and logistics copies of some forms not returned to the office | NOT IMPLEMENTED – there is no effective system for ensuring the distribution forms from the Coordinators and even waybills from the WHS are returned to the office. A significant number of distribution forms especially from the more remote sites had not been returned to the ZOE office. |
| b. | Warehouse management | |
| | General cleanliness of warehouse poor | Implemented – cleanliness of the Bulawayo and Harare warehouses was good – although activity was minimal and stock levels were fairly low (only fertiliser stocked in Harare) |
| | Warehouse records not filed systematically with lack of files and shelving | Partly implemented – Warehouse records were filed - although the system could be improved with training for the WHS and the provision of more files and shelving |
| | No sample jars to monitor for weevils | Implemented - Pest control measures had been put in place |
| | Many split bags with no spare bags available for repacking | Partly implemented – however, WHS's depend on bags being returned from distributions which may not always happen. |
| | Warehouses to be properly equipped | NOT IMPLEMENTED – all warehouses lacked basic equipment (stamps, health and safety notices, accident record books, first aid kits, 'No Smoking' signs, furniture, stationery). All but Bulawayo lacked weighing scales. |
| | Fire extinguisher needed servicing | Partly implemented – Bulawayo and Harare did have fire extinguishing capacity, but not the other warehouses. |
| | Regular supervisory visits needed to warehouses | Partly implemented – the Programme manager had visited only two warehouses on a regular basis (Bulawayo and Gwanda) but had done unannounced stock checks. The Director had not visited any of the warehouses |

3.2.2 Conclusions

a. Data Collection , Storage and Analysis

Filing system – Filing had improved but was still not systematic enough to ensure forms are not misplaced and allow easy access for monitoring and analysis. A workable system is essential and the fact that others people have access to files (eg. Data Capture and M&E staff) makes it even more critical that filing is improved. Filing systems in warehouses could also be improved

Collection of forms - Distribution forms (F2) and waybills had not all been returned to the office for filing many weeks after the end of the distribution and. A review of the Gwanda file showed that 15% of the forms were missing. In Hwange, only 2 months of forms had been sent to the central office. The reconciliation of distributions in Hwange from March onwards was based solely on the WHS summary. The Waybill book for Hwange had not been returned to the office some time after the WHS contract had finished.

WHS's were originally told not to release food until the forms for the previous distribution had been returned but this would have caused serious logistical problems and was abandoned.

The lack of forms presents a real weakness in accountability and means that an audit or analysis of the distributions can't be carried out.

Analysis of data

The Programme Manager, aided by the Data Capture Clerk had carried out a reconciliation of food ordered against food received and food released from the warehouse against food distributed. However the latter was incomplete and errors were found.

In May, the M&E team had made checks on anomalies in the distribution forms and wrote a short report. This information did not seem to have been acted on. For example, in cases where the numbers of beneficiaries do not correspond with the amount of food allocated, those responsible should be made to account for food remaining.

It was apparent that the Programme Manager was not required to provide a regular written analysis of the programme to the Directors

b. Warehouse management

Role and management of WHS's – the WHS role is a very responsible one requiring good numeracy and eye for detail and a strength of character and integrity to ensure high standards are maintained, even under pressure or at times when workload is low and supervision minimal.

All WHS's were promoted from the role of loader and Nick Parham voiced concern about some who had not attained the required level during the training in 2007. During this evaluation, differences were noted - some were more thorough in record keeping (some consistently omitted to fill in boxes on the Waybills) and in taking initiatives taken to improve practice. For example, in Harare, the WHS had made a list of all the sites with the number of beneficiaries which was displayed prominently on the wall. Coordinators phone numbers were also included. He had also written out the process of receiving and despatching goods so drivers were aware of the systems.

However, management of the WHS's had some serious gaps. None was in possession of a job description and only two had had a supervisory visit and performance assessment although they did visit the Bulawayo office periodically to deliver documents. None had received a written description of the processes they were expected to follow from ZOE although all four interviewed said they had a copy of Tearfund's manual for warehousing that they had been given at their training and that they followed.

It was apparent that workload varied greatly at different warehouses with some (Nkayi and Hwange) only receiving and despatching goods a few days each month.

Equipping of WHS's

All WHS's lacked essential equipment to enable them to carry out their roles effectively and efficiently. The most notable was a lack of weighing scales at all warehouses except Bulawayo. This meant that bags could not be sampled for weight.

Other smaller items such as furniture, stationery, files, first aid kits, notices would have cost little but would have made the work easier and contributed to maintaining standards and motivation. Some transporters asked to get their forms stamped, but none of the WHS's had an official stamp.

In Gwanda part of the AFM church was used as the store and local distribution centre. Apart from being too small, some volunteers felt it would have been better to have an location that would have made the distribution independent of the control of the church.

3.2.3 Assessment of warehousing and stock control

While many improvements in the warehousing and stock control have been implemented, there were important recommendations that had either not been actioned at all or had not been fully actioned. As a result, significant inefficiencies and risks would remain in any future feeding programmes if these are not addressed.

A significant part of the reason for this is that Programmes Manager was still being expected to do more than was realistic

3.3 Distribution system

Background

Distribution lists were drawn up by the Coordinators with support from volunteers.

Food was delivered direct from the supplier to each of the 5 warehouses and then ZOE provided transport to take the food to the locations for distribution.

The distribution system was as follows:

- PM contacts supplier to confirm monthly distributions are on schedule and amounts of food to the different warehouses
- Supplier confirms dates of despatch
- PM informs the Warehouse supervisor of planned dates of delivery (and the distribution supervisors working in the 5 warehouses with the warehouse supervisors)
- PM makes a programme for the ZOE trucks to visit each warehouse for distributions and informs the WHS's/Senior coordinators
- WHS/Senior Coordinators (SC) inform other coordinators when food will arrive (1 week notice) and confirm when it does
- WHS/SC make a programme for deliveries using the ZOE truck and informs the coordinators
- WHS/SC inform churches that collect their food that they can collect on specified dates (unique to the Bulawayo and Harare warehouses)
- Coordinators inform the beneficiaries 3 days before the distribution

Distributions were carried out at a location usually decided by the Coordinator and volunteers. Commonly this was a church building. In most cases the volunteers and coordinators carried out weighing but in some, the beneficiaries were actively involved as well.

There were a number of checks on the distribution:

- Members of Area Committees (not at all sites) are present during the distribution to verify names against the distribution form
- A Distribution Supervisor, based at the warehouse accompanies the truck to oversee distributions and ensures that proof of distribution is obtained. They share the burden of the distribution and the Coordinator is not the only one responsible for writing the names and getting signatures. Estimated that about 25% of distributions were attended by a Distribution Supervisor
- Village head/local leaders were present

3.3.1 Findings and Assessment

There major factors disrupting distributions which were largely out of ZOE's control - the political violence, the supply chain and transport problems. It is therefore impossible to assess the efficiency of the distribution system based the regularity of the distributions. However, in general the distribution system was reported to have worked well.

Some indications of efficiency can be gauged from information received from the interviews with different staff and volunteers.

- There was only one report from a WHS who received a delivery arrived from the supplier without prior warning.
- Harare warehouse suffered numerous delays in because trucks were not available. They had to make greater use of the 3.5 tonne truck when one 8T was damaged in an accident
- The churches that distributed food themselves sometimes struggled to find fuel which delayed their distributions
- The Coordinator in Maphisa was changed and when the violence had subsided, the new Coordinator didn't know how to contact ZOE to ask for the distributions to start again.
- 12 out of 13 beneficiaries confirmed that they were informed in advance of the distributions. For this majority this was one day, but was up to 3 days

3.4 Monitoring and evaluation system

The M&E team had written a very comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan.

There were two main monitoring activities:

- Baseline survey of a sample of households, repeated at the mid-point and end of the project principally to gather impact data
- Field Verification visit – random monthly visits to sample sites for monitoring standards in the distribution, size of ration, quality and use of food at household level, monitoring for corruption and independent verification of beneficiary satisfaction.

Unfortunately, due to the unrest and transport problems it wasn't possible to carry out all that was planned.

A baseline survey was carried out in December and January from visits to 31 sites around the country. A total of about 300 households were visited representing 10% at each site. A coping strategies index was used adapted from WFP/Care (Survey Form in Appendix 8). A report was written highlighting a number of important issues:

- Beneficiary lists were not available in over 90% of sites
- Selection criteria were not being properly followed
- There was a high likelihood of duplication with other agencies in several sites where whole communities were being fed
- There was a lack of communication to the Coordinators about the programme

However, quantitative results were not available as the analysis of data given to the Data Capture Officer had still not been completed.

The mid-term survey was not possible due to the unrest and the final survey was carried out in September which formed the basis of the 6 month report. By this time the feeding has stopped at most sites. As the food situation had become more critical than before the programme started, the situation of many orphan households had deteriorated. The M&E Officer felt that the data is unlikely to show a positive change from the feeding programme whereas if the survey had been done two months earlier it would have shown a different picture.

The M&E Officers also carried out about 300 exit surveys (field verification visits) over the 10 provinces (although most in Bulawayo due to the situation) representing 4.2% of the beneficiaries. Ideally these would have happened at the distribution, but usually took place afterwards.

3.5 Adherence to Standards of good practice

To what extent did the project achieve 'good practice'?

The Sphere Handbook and Red Cross Code of Conduct (RCCC) define standards for emergency programmes to attain. These aim to ensure that the dignity and rights of the beneficiaries are respected despite their vulnerable and dependant situations.

Beneficiaries (and volunteers and Coordinators) were asked for information relating to the main standards and responses are summarised below

3.5.1 Findings

a. Distance to the distribution: a fundamental principle is to locate the distribution point where it is most convenient to the beneficiaries rather than the distributors. Vulnerable families are ill equipped to travel long distances and this can put them at risk. Distances varied greatly. In the rural areas those interviewed walked an average of about 2 km. However, volunteers in Maphisa explained that people from some areas walked up to 13km to get food. The volunteers were unwilling to consider doing a second distribution in another area to reduce the distance people walked because of concerns about possible misuse of the food. Similarly in Gumtree, those from the furthest parts of the area had to walk very long distances. In Bulawayo and Harare urban areas as well, where the distribution was done by individual churches, distances could also be very high. In one case beneficiaries were having to get transport over 20km from Cowdray Park to the centre of Bulawayo. This occurred because the church (Glad Tidings) was serving orphan families from a number of its urban and peri-urban congregations, from a single, central distribution. The beneficiaries were obliged to pay for the hire of transport even though another church (Methodist?) was doing a distribution in Cowdray Park. A similar situation occurred in Kuwadzana, Harare, where some people had to walk up to 13km from another township to collect their food from the church. The Coordinators didn't seem to think this was a major problem and that the benefits (ease of management) outweighed the disadvantages for the beneficiaries

b. Time at distribution: efficient systems for measuring food and recording information can avoid time wasted. The length of distributions varied considerably with some people spending up to 4 hours waiting for their food but others as little as half an hour. Although not researched in detail, different systems were used – in one case the distribution didn't start until most of the people had arrived. The most efficient seemed to be those in which the beneficiaries themselves were fully involved. None of the beneficiaries interviewed complained about the length of time.

c. Advance notice of distribution: beneficiaries should be warned in advance to minimise inconvenience and reduce the chance of them missing the distribution. There were no complaints from beneficiaries about this although some people said that on occasions advance notice wasn't given. Due to the general high level of hunger, to discourage non-beneficiaries from coming in the hope of getting food, some churches didn't make general announcements but relied on volunteers visiting the beneficiaries to inform them individually.

d. Financial contribution for distribution: where urban churches need to collect the food from the ZOE warehouse, the church had agreed to provide fuel. This was understood to be the contribution from the church and none of the Coordinators claimed it was a problem. However, some beneficiaries said that they were regularly asked to provide the money for fuel as the church wasn't able to do so. It is not known how widespread this practice is.

e. Quality of food: poor quality food could affect the health of beneficiaries and this relates to systems for identifying poor quality food and for storage and transport. All beneficiaries interviewed were positive about the quality of food – in only one case were there signs that the CSB was a bit old, but it was edible.

f. Selection on basis of need: from the beneficiary visits, some impressions could be gained about whether the criteria for selection were adequate or were being followed.

Of 13 beneficiaries visited all had orphans. However, 2 families were not especially vulnerable and should not have been on the list. In one case the elderly carers were fit and not infirm. Four others had other sources of support, significant assets or employment. One who was better off was a (female) church leader.

Although this may well not have been a representative sample, it is a significant proportion and follows from the previous evaluation that recommended 'the selection procedure should be tightened and selection closely monitored'. The M&E Officers also found (Feb 08 report) that selection criteria were not being followed.

g. Pressure to attend church: most of the beneficiaries interviewed said there was no pressure for them to attend church. At least four out of 13 were Christians anyway. Only one was afraid she might be taken off the list. In Harare in a discussion group, before they were chided by others, two orphans said that if they stopped going to church they were sure their rations would be stopped.

h. Transparency of distribution process (adequacy of information provided)

Beneficiaries said there was a reasonable level of transparency although there were cases where people felt this was a problem. In general people knew what ration they were entitled to and none of the beneficiaries complained that they had not been given the correct amount. However, there were indications that limited information was being given and that people would have been more critical if they had felt at liberty to do so. On two occasions, volunteers interrupted or 'corrected' beneficiaries when they started to say something critical.

There was a lack of information about the following:

The duration of feeding programme: none of the beneficiaries and volunteers and few of the Coordinators knew how long the distributions would continue for. In large part this may have been due to the disruption to the deliveries that extended the programme beyond 6 months, but a number of vulnerable families were expecting the feeding to continue and were not making alternative plans (eg approaching another agency to get on their list). ZOE need to communicate clearly and regularly to the Coordinators so that this information is disseminated.

The inter-denominational nature of the programme: there were some tensions where the feeding programme was perceived to be dominated or controlled by one denomination. Some pastors expressed disappointment that they had little information about ZOE or the feeding programme and felt as if the Coordinator acted as a gatekeeper.

3.5.2 Conclusions – Adherence to standards

There are many pitfalls to managing a relief programme – not least when it is implemented through a third party over which you have no direct control. On the whole, ZOE and the churches should be congratulated for their achievement in very difficult circumstances. It was to their credit that almost everyone spoke positively about the relief programme and that there were so few cases of misallocation of food.

However, it is clear from the above that there needs to be improvement against some standards if ZOE continues feeding in the future. It was apparent that:

- Drawing up beneficiary lists is a critical area that needs to be improved
- Beneficiaries often have to walk long distances and spend excessive time (and in some cases money) to get food
- Beneficiaries lack of information about the duration of the programme and are therefore not making alternative plans

Secondly, good communication is essential not just for coordination but for transparency. This will help to avoid suspicion and resentment that can come in even when no malpractice

is happening and will help to safeguard the reputation of the church and of ZOE and safeguard unity which are put at risk when:

- Leaders control information and present themselves as gatekeepers
- Food is perceived to be used to give advantage, status and influence to one church over another
- Food is used to coerce or reward people for attending church or where church members are prioritised rather than the most vulnerable

Although the responses during interviews generally painted a positive picture, there was evidence that if church leaders, volunteers and beneficiaries had felt freer to voice their complaints, more would have emerged. Food is a scarce and valuable commodity and it gives pastors considerable power to be able to control it.

These give indications of where training could focus and where ongoing monitoring is needed.

3.6 Coordination with other agencies

The main agencies who are doing distributions are: World Food Programme (through various implementing partners); World Vision/Care (part of the CSAFE consortium); Red Cross and Christian Care. There are strong mechanisms for coordination between these agencies at national and regional level. Within each district, wards are allocated to one organisation to provide food to selected beneficiaries so there is no overlap.

In contrast, ZOE feeds at 70+ sites throughout the country. In February 2008 the M&E officer checked for duplication with other agencies at 30 sites. In over 80% of these WFP partners were already involved in feeding. There was felt to be a high risk of duplication where certain organisations were feeding and in two cases it was found that all the ZOE beneficiaries were already receiving food. At that time, the M&E team felt that there was very limited knowledge or concern with the churches about coordination with other agencies.

Some coordinators said they were actively checking for duplication, At Nkayi, the Coordinator (Shadrach Ncube) was very well connected in the local community and sat on the Drought Relief Committee and was District chair of the National AIDS Committee. He was well aware of the other agencies who were distributing. However, some other coordinators are likely not to be so well connected.

Registering for food and receiving it can be a tiring and demeaning business and many beneficiaries said that they preferred receiving from ZOE rather than other agencies because their process was less time-consuming and more personal. In addition, other agencies gave foodstuffs that were less preferred (eg barley) and none of the others gave CSB.

5 out of 13 beneficiaries interviewed said they had been or were on the list of another agency (Red Cross or World Vision) – some had started getting food since ZOE's 2008 programme had ended. This suggests that many of ZOE's beneficiaries could get food through another source if necessary. One admitted to getting rations from ZOE and another agency at the same time.

3.7 Cooperation on FGW with River of Life

ZOE and RoL ended their formal cooperation in training on FGW in about 2005. The rationale for working together had been that with RoL based in the north and ZOE in the south, they could cover sites more efficiently if they each focused on one part of the country. However, friction arose because of differences in approach: RoL was mainly training able

farmers while ZOE focused on the vulnerable and children. In this context, RoL applied a stringent M&E system with higher expectations of its site Coordinators; monitoring visits would assess the Site Supervisor on his fields and those s/he had trained against clear standards and after three bad reports they would be removed from the programme. RoL's experience was that pastors rarely made good Site Supervisors due to their other commitments - success depended on their commitment and approach (including transparency, accountability) and on regular follow up and support. ZOE felt that a more flexible approach was appropriate.

Another difference was that if RoL considered the existing church in the area wasn't strong enough, they might look to plant a church while ZOE's ethos was always to work through the existing church.

Despite the tensions at the time, the parting was amicable.

RoL itself has undergone a major reorganisation of its development work in the last year with a new vision for a holistic approach to life, promoting 'Gods Way' in every area of life. They have changed their approach to implementing FGW and are no longer continuing their intensive support to communities throughout the country through the quarterly trainings. They are now doing longer more intensive 4 week training for Faithful Steward Activators/Gods Way Activators who are carefully selected and then followed up.

While there is no formal cooperation at present, ZOE's Harare office (where the Farming Gods Way Coordinator is based) shares space with the RoL 'Gods Way' Office in Mt Pleasant so there is regular informal contact.

4. Major factors Influencing the efficiency of the project and increasing risk.

4.1 General Management issues within ZOE

In December 2007, following his visit, Nick Parham made a number of recommendations regarding general organisation and management of staff. These included:

1. Providing support to the Programmes Manager (Qobolwakhe Khumalo) in view of his increased responsibilities
2. Reviewing the organisational structure (in view of recruitment of additional staff)
3. Ensuring responsibilities and reporting lines are clear to everyone (review job descriptions)
4. Ensuring staff roles represent sensible division of labour and all work is covered
5. Reviewing staff management, particularly those in remote locations (WHS's)

At the start of the feeding programme, additional contract staff were taken on to manage the increased workload. These included a Data Capture Clerk (Mrs Moyo) and an additional M&E Officer (Nosiwe). The Data Capture Clerk was recommended in order to support the Programmes Manager

4.1.1 Findings – General Management

| | NP's recommendations | Action taken |
|---|--|---|
| a | Provide support to the Programmes Manager (Qobolwakhe Khumalo) in view of his increased responsibilities | Partly implemented but workload still excessive for effective management of the relief programme |
| b | Review the organisational structure (in view of recruitment of additional staff) | NOT IMPLEMENTED? – If this was reviewed by management, it has not been effectively actioned as there is still lack of clarity among staff |
| c | Ensure responsibilities and reporting lines are clear to everyone (review job descriptions) | NOT IMPLEMENTED |
| d | Ensure staff roles represent sensible division of labour and all work is covered | NOT IMPLEMENTED |
| e | Review staff management, particularly those in remote locations (WHS's) | NOT IMPLEMENTED |

a. Support for the Programmes Manager role.

Qobolwakhe Khumalo has been covering three roles – Programme Manager Relief programme, Logistician Relief programme and Project Manager of the Livelihoods project. In addition, has managed procurement of one vehicle for ZOE.

In response to NP's recommendations to support to the Programme Manager, a Data Capture Clerk's was employed. Although she was supposed to report to him, in practice she worked closely with the Data Capture Officer (Max) and spent a large part of her time entering beneficiary data

According to Q's assessment, the Livelihoods Project Officer role took up 60% of his time. It is clear that of the remainder, the majority of his time is spent on the logistician role. Little time has been available for proactive project management, particularly regular contact with the Coordinators, to improve quality and efficiency in the relief programme.

b. Organisational structure

During the evaluation, staff were asked to draw the organogram for the part of the organisation directly involved in the feeding programme. This is shown in Fig 1. It is interesting to note that three staff (two M&E Officers and the Data Capture Officer) see themselves on a par, and all reporting directly to the Director (Pastor Manceda). This is despite the fact that the Data Capture Officer was employed to support the M&E team and his job description states that he reports to the M&E Officer.

Even if this could be made to work, it would be an inefficient use of the Directors time to have to manage three people at a similar level. In reality, it has contributed to a lack of coordination between the three officers.

c&d. Responsibilities, reporting lines, division of labour.

As noted above, responsibility and authority (reporting lines) are not clearly delegated. For example, the Director felt he had given the Programmes Manager freedom to carry out his role (eg. by taking a hands off approach - not asking for regular reports and information), but had retained a large measure of decision making power. No job description could be provided for the Programmes Manager.

Nosiwe had been recruited as a second M&E officer to work with Nkiwane. Despite having less experience, she was given the same title and paid the same salary. She was expected to report to Nkiwane but this was never made very clear and it was left for them to decide how to work together. The M&E dept would have functioned more efficiently Nkiwane had been given authority to manage Nosiwe.

ZOE has an egalitarian ethos which means that there is little differentiation in salaries between different roles. Whatever advantages this approach has seem to be outweighed by a general lack of clarity about responsibility and authority, which in turn reduces efficiency and undermines motivation of staff. People are wary of taking initiatives in case they 'step on someone else's toes' and work is missed where responsibilities are not clearly defined.

e. Staff management in remote locations

Staff in Harare felt somewhat distant from the rest of the organisation and were disempowered by a lack of authority and resources to carry out their role effectively. As noted, the management of the WHS's has been very limited due to a number of factors.

4.1.2 Other management issues

The issues that Nick Parham identified still need to be followed up to ensure adequate efficiency in management. In addition there are several other management issues that need to be addressed:

a. Transport

Lack of transport for staff has been a major constraint particularly to the Programmes Manager, the M&E team and the Coordinator based in Harare (Pastor Munemo). A single cab pick up was purchased for the relief project in 2008 and has been based in Bualwayo. However, due to demands from other projects, it has been shared across the organisation. ZOE disposed of two old pickups with a view to purchasing a one new one. One of these vehicles was sold to Pastor Munemo which he uses in his role. However, it is in very poor condition and not reliable. Although he uses it for supervising the relief programme, the system for covering running costs was vague.

b. Role of M&E team

Nosiwe was recruited as a second M&E Officer to support Thabani Nkiwane who still had responsibilities for M&E within the other projects.

The role of the M&E team is ambiguous within ZOE – while they see themselves as a support to help the programmes learn and improve performance, there is evidence that they are seen by some as a threat - gathering information that can expose weaknesses. Without a clear mandate from the Directors and an agreed way of working with the different departments, they cannot be fully effective and ZOE cannot become a learning organisation.

c. Budget management

Budget management is a big challenge in Zimbabwe. Fortunately, most of the expenditure (on food) is paid directly in forex so is not changed in the \$Zimbabwe

Allocation of transport costs needs to be tightened to ensure that vehicle costs are charged to the correct programme account.

4.2 Improving accountability - should pastors be in the role of Coordinators for the Feeding programme?

Currently about 75% of the Coordinators are pastors. In this role they are usually directly involved in the food distributions (identifying/agreeing beneficiaries, handling food, reporting, etc.).

One major problem is that this works against developing a strong system of accountability because the status of pastors makes it very difficult for anyone to question practice or suggest changes – as someone put it, ‘challenge the Lord’s anointed’.

However, if the pastor were in an oversight rather than an implementing role, accountability would be greatly enhanced.

Pastors are very busy and generally have too many responsibilities to carry out all the tasks to the required standard. Partly because of this record keeping is often weak and there has been resistance to improving it. The M&E team noted serious weaknesses in registration, inappropriate selection of beneficiaries, lack of knowledge about other feeding programmes (Field trip report 3 Feb 2008). It has sometimes been impossible for ZOE staff to get the necessary documentation.

Some pastors have handed over responsibility for distributions to others. In other places, accountability committees have been set up where groups of churches in an area provide oversight to the distributions (typically comprising pastors 2-3, beneficiaries 2, community leader 1). In the sites where HAP has been established, Pastors have voluntarily given the responsibility to others as they realise they don’t need to be so involved.

Beneficiary accountability: a system of promoting accountability to beneficiaries was piloted by the M&E team in 3 communities prior to the 2008 feeding programme to empower beneficiaries and provide a mechanism to hold those responsible for the distributions accountable. Although it had been planned to extend this to a further 3 sites in 2008, the political unrest and other pressures meant this couldn't happen. The results of this system have been impressive and have impacted on several of the areas of inefficiency noted above.

Beneficiaries effectively take control of the distribution process, deciding where and how it should happen. This eliminates excessive journeys, time wasted and helps to maintain respect for people's dignity. Beneficiaries know the most needy in their communities and those who are getting food from another agency so can alert someone to follow up such cases.

If effectively run so that beneficiaries know their rights and have a channel for challenging poor practice, the system had huge potential to foster good practice and eliminate the things that bring accusations against the church

Agreement forms have been proposed (and piloted) that would help to provide accurate information on the needs in the communities and which other organisations are doing feeding - helping to avoid duplication. They would clarify the responsibilities of the churches and ZOE and the contributions they are making. The advantage would be that this would be a public document and would have to be signed by a number of people (incl. local councils) not just the Coordinator. It would provide a standard against which churches can assess themselves and to which ZOE can refer if problems occur.

However, it needs to be recognised that unless there is regular monitoring and some sanctions are applied promptly when the agreement is broken, these too will not be effective in the long term.

4.3 Training of Coordinators and volunteers

The efficiency of the distribution and standard of practice is highly dependant on having effective coordinators.

Many of the 70 or so Coordinators would have received some training in previous years, but for the 2008 programme one day of information and training was provided in December 2007. This comprised:

- Principles of RCCC (copy given to everyone translated into vernacular)
- Introduction to HAP (beneficiary accountability pilot) with findings from the baseline survey and offer to be included in the next 3 sites
- Logistics information and update on transport
- Coordinators role in implementation – ration entitlements, use of CSB, completion of forms (with threatened sanction of delayed food)

The Coordinators were expected to pass on this information and train church leaders, Distribution Supervisors and volunteers in their areas who were involved in the feeding programme.

Coordinators who were interviewed were asked what training they had received – most struggled to recall any of the content.

Volunteers who were asked if they had received training from a Coordinator commonly said that it was just a matter of passing on information rather than training – they were 'just told what to do'.

Regarding the impact of the training, there was little evidence for example that the Coordinators or volunteers interviewed had been proactive in following standards of good practice. This was borne out by the lack of concern about the long distances beneficiaries travelled to get food.

Conclusions

There is a need to strengthen training as what was provided did not make a strong impression. This should be relevant and tackle real issues that the Coordinators and volunteers face. However, it should be recognised that training alone will not be sufficient. Coordinators who are pastors have a number of reasons why they may not give priority to training others. Implementing beneficiary accountability and strengthening monitoring will have a greater impact in the long term

5. Recommendations

Explanation of priority on recommendations:

Recommendations have been made on the premise that ZOE will continue a feeding programme in 2009.

First priority has been given to addressing management issues in the wider organisation as well as the relief programme – there are fundamental issues ZOE needs to address in order to be a healthy organisation and it is recommended that these principles are applied all of ZOE's programmes.

Second priority has been given to measures that will improve standards in distribution and accountability since this was where the greatest risk seems to lie and have the most immediate impact on the dignity and protection of the vulnerable orphan.

Third priority has been given to improving the logistical systems – although these are very important to ensure good stewardship of resources.

The fourth area of recommendations (whether ZOE should continue relief feeding) is more strategic in nature, so is not easily prioritised

5.1 Recommendations on Management

In order to address management weaknesses in ZOE the following recommendations are made (in order of priority):

a. Management of ZOE: Appoint a general manager who has proven management experience to take responsibility for the day to day management of ZOE and to ensure effective coordination of all the different projects, including any future relief programme. This will free the Directors to concentrate on their strengths of communicating ZOE's objectives, envisioning churches, networking, etc. It will be a challenging process for the Directors to hand over responsibility, so it would be important that delegated responsibilities are clearly defined and periodically reviewed during the transition period.

b. Staff structure and roles: Review the structure of the relief programme, re-write job descriptions and clarify lines of reporting. Clarify the role and responsibility of the M&E team so they can be effective

c. Programme Manager role: Separate the roles of Relief Programme Manager (RPM) and Logistician to ensure so that the RPM can concentrate more time on the interface with the Coordinators and volunteers to prioritise rolling out beneficiary accountability and prepare for exit (see recommendation 4). Clarify the key success areas of the RPM role.

d. Monitoring and evaluation: General manager should promote a learning culture within the organisation by promoting ownership of the M&E process and active involvement of all staff, Coordinators and volunteers. Analysis of data from the base line and final surveys should be completed and lessons drawn.

e. Staff appointments: Re-interview contract staff and award a further contract if successful. If people are not suited to one role, they can apply for another and re-locate if successful.

e. Salaries and appraisal system: Review salaries at the beginning of new contracts and set them to be appropriate to the level of responsibility. A system of quarterly and annual appraisal should be implemented with the possibility of salary increments to recognise achievement and increase motivation.

f. Transport: Review the adequacy and use of transport as this is a severe constraint. - If the relief programme is continued, additional transport (and other logistical support) should be obtained so that staff are able to work efficiently. The needs of the staff in Harare (Coordinator and Agriculture Officer) are particularly critical as the AO is dependant on public transport. As the greater need is for transport of staff rather than materials, it is recommended that double cabin pickups are purchased in future. Vehicles paid for out of the relief budget should be restricted to that programme and alternative sources of fuel should be investigated.

g. Planning and Coordination: Formalise weekly meetings for planning and coordination of all those involved in the relief programme

5.2 Recommendations on Standards and Accountability

a. Beneficiary Accountability. A system of beneficiary accountability should be rolled out as soon as possible at all sites so that beneficiaries are empowered to decide how the distributions are done with the aim of a fairer more efficient system. Adequate resources should be committed to follow this through. Even if a limited version of BA is introduced (written posters for each site with a phone number and address for feedback, plus follow up) this will go a long way to improving accountability. For ZOE to drive the changes by setting and enforcing policies would involve a lot more work and would probably have a lower chance of success.

b. Structures for accountability. Ensure that pastors step back from a coordination role into a supervisory role where they can oversee implementation as part of a wider governance structure.

The challenges in implementing this are recognised and while ZOE depends on relationships with pastors for all their work, the risk of weak accountability remains as long as pastors continue in this role

c. Introduce Agreement forms to all sites

d. Training for Coordinators and volunteers. Carry out a participatory exercise with coordinators to review weaknesses of the programme and design a training programme for Coordinators and Volunteers, for implementing beneficiary accountability and their supervisory role. The importance of forms and record keeping should be included and robust procedure for checking duplication with other agencies. Limit the numbers in each training to be more effective.

e. Processes documented. Write down and disseminate the roles of the Coordinator and Distribution Supervisor in the relief programme (a job description) including models and principles of good practice that the churches should aim for

f. Improve coordination with other agencies at national and local levels to avoid duplication.

g. Monitoring plan The General Manager should have ownership of the monitoring plan and ensure resources are provided to get timely recommendations on distributions and on stock management. Due to limits of M&E staff time, the use of volunteer field monitors to carry out surveys should be tested.

5.3 Recommendations on procurement, warehousing, stock control systems (not prioritised)

a. Procurement (Sect 3.1): verifying compliance to the procurement process should be included in the Finance Managers job description and should be done before final budgets are submitted to partners/donors. If there are reasons why competitive tendering has not been possible (or has had to be delayed) the partner/donor should be informed.

b. Warehousing and stock control (Sect 3.2)

i) Filing - A functional, systematic filing system should be set up for stock control records and maintained. Training should be given for everyone using filed documents

ii) Collection of forms

- The missing distribution forms and waybills should be located so that a reconciliation of the amount of food received and distributed in 2008 can be completed.
- For any future distributions, a workable system for collecting forms needs to be designed with the cooperation of all stakeholders
- Refresher training given to Coordinators/Distribution Supervisors about

iii) Analysis of data

- The General Manager should put in place systems for accountability and reporting and specify what information is needed each month to monitor stock control. Responsibilities for collecting, analysing and checking the data should be clearly assigned.
- The M&E team should carry out a monthly check of the distribution forms and write a short report for the Relief Programmes Manager and General Manager/Directors. This should include quantitative data such as i) the percentage of forms not returned ii) sample of the number and type of anomalies

c. Warehouse management

i) Role and management of WHS's

- WHS's should have a written job description and a document clearly outlining their duties and the systems they should follow
- Before re-engaging the WHS's they should be assessed on their performance
- A training should be organised with a system of 3 monthly appraisal put in place with unannounced visits made on a monthly basis.
- The role of the WHS should be reviewed to include some analysis and reporting on distributions to reduce the workload of the Programme Manager
- Consideration given to making the WHS a part-time role at certain sites and the workload difference reflected in salary.

ii) Equipping of warehouses

- Review the comprehensive list of recommendations made by NP and ensure essential equipment is included in the budget and purchased including phones for communications.
- Review security at all warehouses particularly Harare which has temporary closure in one wall and the proposed new store at Gwanda which has a hole in a wall.

5.4 Recommendations on ZOE's continued involvement in relief feeding

It is recommended that ZOE continued feeding in 2009, but should seriously consider discontinuing engaging in large scale feeding programmes beyond this year

2009

The situation is worse in all areas than it was at the start of 2008. Food is very difficult to buy even if you have money – and increasingly is only available to those who have forex. There are high expectations from beneficiaries that have been on ZOE's list for several years. Beneficiaries are anticipating a resumption of food although this has not been confirmed. Many may not have therefore bothered to register with other organisations.

2010

In the long term ZOE should end its involvement in wide scale feeding programmes but rather focus its resources on two areas:

- a) Strengthening and extending its livelihoods programme including Farming Gods Way and
- b) Exploring ways to help churches to promote initiatives such as local reserves, that build local capacity to be more self reliant (as recommended in the previous evaluation).

The reasons for ending the large scale food distributions are as follows:

- Feeding on a national scale is inherently inefficient and duplicates operational costs
- Other agencies are better equipped to carry out large feeding programmes - with planning and effective advocacy, none of ZOE's beneficiaries need be excluded from other agencies feeding programmes
- Finding the sums of money necessary is uncertain and if unsuccessful this can put people who are expecting food at risk
- It demands much of the time and energy of the ZOE leadership and staff that would be better used in promoting sustainable livelihoods and advocating to ensure any vulnerable families receive help from other agencies
- There is some evidence that it undermines the effectiveness of the volunteers and coordinators in the core programme

There will be resistance to ending feeding though as it does enhance the church's credibility and relevance especially in a situation where food is literally a matter of life and death. Pastors expressed reluctance to pass beneficiaries on to other agencies saying 'ZOE can do it better because we give the spiritual and relational support as well'. The assumption here is that their pastoral work and ZOE's core programme (providing spiritual and relational support) counts for little when people are starving. However, there are alternative more sustainable strategies to strengthening food security that churches could adopt. The church has done much in advocating for proper governance and services. Taking an even stronger advocacy role to address the roots of the food crisis would do most to show the church's relevance.

One of the arguments for continuing feeding has been that beneficiaries may 'slip through the net' and not get support from other agencies. Evidence has shown that this need not be the case if there is adequate coordination with WFP, RC, WV etc. at national and field levels, and if written information reaches communities. There is no reason why genuine beneficiaries would not qualify. A greater emphasis should be placed on training volunteers to advocate for the orphan families to ensure they are included on another feeding programme.

If accepted, ZOE should start to prepare an exit strategy so as not to put beneficiaries at risk. Clear unequivocal information needs to be given that feeding will not continue, and coordination strengthened with other agencies at regional and national level. Beneficiary details need to be improved and kept up to date for follow up with other agencies.

5.5 Recommendations for Tearfund, Tear Netherlands and Tearfund Switzerland

1. Longer planning and preparation time is needed for relief programmes of this kind – assessment and planning needs to be done 4 months in advance so that equipment and inputs can be purchased, staff recruited and trained.
2. Closely support ZOE in the phase of strengthening management – advise on recruitment of a General Manager if required and according to the level of his/her capacity, make resources available for ongoing support.

Annexe 1

- **Terms of Reference for the Evaluation**

BACKGROUND

- **Programme Title**
Emergency food relief for orphans and vulnerable children in Zimbabwe
- **Background to programme**
Zimbabwe has been in the grip of a political crisis over the past eight years and as a result has left people poorer and more vulnerable to shocks. Orphans, the elderly of those who are chronically ill are struggling to survive and livelihoods options for them are extremely limited. Food has not only been unavailable in the country, but has also become too expensive. The staple, maize meal, has been scarce for at least two years. ZOE made the decision to support their beneficiaries with food aid and have been doing so for the past 6 years. The harvest in 2007 was particularly bad because of drought and so Integral partners and Tear Australia raised funds to support ZOE's programme to feed 35,000 individuals.
- **Summary findings of previous reports, evaluations**
Previous evaluations carried out found:
 - That the use of the local church was a particularly good method of food distribution in Zimbabwe's politically tense environment. Churches were viewed with more trust than NGOs. However, the weakness of the local church is a tendency to favour congregation members for receipt of food and also to proselytise the beneficiaries. While we recognise the need for integral mission, we also have to ensure adherence to the Red Cross Code of Conduct.
 - That there were some irregularities in the targeting of beneficiaries. To some degree, implementation of HAP-I standards would address this but to date, ZOE have only rolled those out to 3 sites.
 - That procurement methods did not always follow the recommended process.
 - That ZOE's beneficiaries were in a group that would continue to need food aid even in a politically stable state.
- **Partner profile and history**
ZOE have been in operation since 1992 and currently provide care through local church volunteers to some 78,000 orphans and vulnerable children. Their core activities are to mobilise churches to understand their potential and their biblical mandate to care for children in their communities who have lost one or both parents. ZOE provide ongoing support to the churches by training volunteers, sourcing funding and monitoring the programmes.
- **Current Activities**
Church volunteer mobilisation and training; provision of skills training, food aid and livelihoods projects through the church network;
- **How the need for the requested assignment arose**
An evaluation is required by IPMS for an approval over £250,000. In addition, Integral partners will soon be applying for new funding from

PURPOSE

The aim of this assignment is to conduct an evaluation of ZOE's relief programme.

An evaluation is the assessment at one point in time of the outcomes of a project. Outcomes refer to the effect the project has had in terms of the original situation and the original objectives. At a basic level, an evaluation asks whether project objectives have been achieved and whether the original aims and assumptions are valid. An evaluation is an integral part of the project cycle. If carried out

well, an evaluation should increase transparency and allow all stakeholders to be able to influence the direction and emphasis of the project.

An evaluation therefore has two main functions: to strengthen accountability and to increase learning.

The specific objective of this assignment is to make assessments for each of the following six Aspects:

Aspect 1 – effectiveness

Has the project been effective in achieving the intended project objectives?

Areas for consideration include:

- the achievement of the project outputs;
- the achievement of the project purpose;
- the contribution towards the project goal;
- the major factors influencing the achievement of the project objectives.

Aspect 2 – impact

What impact has the project had on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries?

Areas for consideration include:

- the intended and unintended effects, both positive and negative, of the project on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries;
- the major factors influencing the impact of the project on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

Aspect 3 – efficiency

Has the project been efficient in achieving the intended objectives?

Areas for consideration include:

- to what degree do ZOE's systems and processes enable efficient procurement, warehousing and distribution, including:
 - Reviewing Nic Parham's report, which of his recommendations have been implemented and which are still outstanding?
 - Did beneficiaries receive food on time each month (with the exception of interruptions due to political violence)?
 - How efficient is the system in tracking quantities of food requested, dispatched, distributed and reconciled?
 - Do all five warehouses follow the correct procedures and are distributions timely?
 - How well trained were the coordinators and volunteers who carried out distributions?
- the major factors influencing the efficiency of the project and increasing risk;
- evidence of knowledge of and adherence to standards of good practice especially Sphere and RCCC;
- the efficiency of the monitoring systems.

In making assessments for each Aspect, the Consultant should also consider how 'good practice' has been incorporated into the project.

METHODOLOGY

- the consultant is free to determine the best methods for gathering the information.

SCHEDULING

- Dates for:
 - briefing – 23rd October
 - travel – 26th October – 13th November
 - submission of draft report for comments – 21st November
 - submission of final report – 12th December
- Itinerary will be arranged with the M&E officer for ZOE on the 27th October.

MANAGEMENT OF VISIT

- Karyn Beattie is commissioning and approving the work
- All queries or issues should be referred to Karyn
- Responsibility for practical arrangements, travel etc. will be handled between Karyn and ZOE.

EXPECTED OUTPUT

The expected output of this assignment is a report (in Tearfund standard reporting format: please refer to the *Consultants' Briefing Pack*) with the following sections:

- Executive Summary (no more than four A4 sides)
- Introduction / Background
- Methodology
- Context Analysis
- For each Aspect, a section in the form
 - Findings
 - Conclusions
 - Assessment
- Specific Actionable and Prioritised Recommendations
- Annexes (indicative)
 - Terms of Reference for the Evaluation
 - Evaluation Schedule
 - List of documents consulted during the Evaluation
 - Persons participating in the Evaluation
 - Field data used during the Evaluation, including baselines

For each of the six Aspects outlined under 'Purpose', the Consultant is required make a clear statement of their assessment of the project's achievements.

REQUIRED INPUTS

- People to be involved : ZOE's M&E officers; warehouse managers; project manager; directors; data capture clerks; selected coordinators
- Documents : ZOE's approved proposal and budget; ZOE's final narrative and financial reports; Nic Parham's report; the last evaluation report (2006); trip reports by Tearfund personnel.

EVALUATION OF CONSULTANCY

- Feedback form from the partner: To be completed by Thabani Nkiwane and returned to Tearfund by 1st Dec.
- Karyn Beattie from Tearfund UK, Caspar Waalewijn from Tear NL, Ulrich Bachman from Tearfund Switzerland and Geoff Quinn from Tear Australia will review and comment on the report (it may not be possible for all to comment)

OTHER INFORMATION

Appendix 2 – Schedule for ZOE Feeding Programme evaluation

| Date | Activity/objective | People involved |
|--------------|--|--|
| Sunday 26 | Travel to Bulawayo via Joburg | |
| Monday 27 | Arrival Bulawayo 13.00 14.00 – 17.00 Introductions to staff <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timeline exercise to provide an overview of the implementation of the project and highlight the successes, challenges as well as the key events and issues that affected the implementation • Review of programme, summary overview of project implementation (ZOE Office) | Programmes Manager M&E Officers Data Capture Officer |
| Tuesday 28 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of log frame using problem tree to clarify hierarchy of objectives, indicators and risks • Review of organogram for relief programme and review of job descriptions • Review of effectiveness | Programmes Manager M&E Officers Data Capture Officer |
| Wednesday 29 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of systems and processes for procurement, warehousing and distribution • Meeting coordinators and volunteer from Glad Tidings and New Life for All churches (Bulawayo Urban) | Programmes Manager M&E Officers |
| Thursday 30 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visit to Bulawayo warehouse. Interview with WHS • Meeting Coordinators/volunteers Agape Centre Bulawayo • Meeting Coordinator/volunteers/ beneficiaries Lobengula, Bulawayo | Dumisani Mpfu |
| Friday 31 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting Coordinator/volunteers/ beneficiaries Gumtree | |
| Saturday 1 | Planning and preparation | |
| Sunday 2 | Rest day | |
| Monday 3 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting Coordinator/ volunteers/ beneficiaries in Maphisa | |
| Tuesday 4 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting FGW Officer • Discussions M&E team • Discussions Promise Manceda – Director • Meeting Nkayi Warehouse Supervisor in Bulawayo | Shungu Thabani Nkiwane, Nosiwe Thabani Nyangane |
| Wednesday 5 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting Tessa Vorbohle, World Vision • Meeting Coordinators and beneficiaries in Nkayi | Thabani Nkiwane, Nosiwe |
| Thursday 6 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting Programmes Manager • Meeting Accountant • Meeting Directors • Meeting Data Capture Officer | Qobolwakhe Khumalo Su Amuli Jean, Promise Max |
| Friday 7 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial feedback and discussion with Directors, Board Member and DMO | Jean, Promise, Amos Ncube, Karyn Beattie |
| Saturday 8 | Planning / preparation / writing | |
| Sunday 9 | Rest day | |
| Monday 10 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting volunteers / beneficiaries Gwanda • Meeting Coordinator Gwanda | Pastor Mbedzi |
| Tuesday 11 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Travel to Harare | |

| | | |
|--------------|--|----------------------------------|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visit to Harare warehouse • Meeting Shungu, | |
| Wednesday 12 | Meeting Coordinators/volunteers / beneficiaries Kuwadzana (Harare urban) | |
| Thursday 13 | Meeting Coordinators Flight Harare – Joburg - London | Peter Zhanghaza Pastor Munemo |

Appendix 3 - List of documents consulted during the Evaluation

- ZOE Project proposal and budget – Emergency food relief for orphans and vulnerable children in Zimbabwe (19 November 2007)
- Project document review on Proposal (14 November 2007)
- Project report (6 months?) – undated)
- Evaluation of ZOEs Emergency Relief Response 2005 – Ruvimbo Mabeza-Chimedza (Oct-Dec 2006)
- ZOE and CIB Logistics Systems Consultancy Report – Nick Parham (Nov-Dec 2007)

Internal ZOE documents

Field data used during the Evaluation, including baselines

- Monitoring and Evaluation plan Dec 07 – June 08 – Thabani Nkiwane (ZOE M&E Officer)
- M&E Field trip report for December – January (3 Feb 2008)
- Report on Analysis of F2 (Distribution) forms (by M&E dept. undated – May 08?)
- Reconciliation form for Goods Received with Purchase Order (Afrilink and V&N) Programmes Manager spreadsheet
- Master list of Goods Released (Reconciliation of goods released and distributed) – Programmes Manager Spreadsheet

Appendix 4: Persons participating in and consulted during Evaluation

Qobolwakhe Khumalo (Programmes Manager)
Thabani Nkiwane (M&E Officer)
Nosiwe (M&E officer)
Jean Webster (Director)
Promise Manceda (Director)
Su Amuli (ZOE Accountant)
Max (Data Capture Officer)
Warehouse supervisors (Dumisani Mpofu – Bulawayo; Siphon Tembo – Gwanda; Tinei Magwenzi – Harare; Thabani Nyangane - Nkayi)
Pastor Munemo (ZOE Area Coordinator Harare & Mashonaland)
Shungu Nyandoro – (ZOE Trainer for Farming Gods Way)
Senior Coordinators – Pastor Mbedzi (Gwanda), Shadrach Ncube (Nkayi), Peter Zhanghaza (Harare)
Coordinators, volunteers and beneficiaries at the following sites: Bulawayo town (4 churches), Gumtree, Maphisa, Gwanda, Nkayi, Harare
Tessa Vorbohle, (World Vision Bulawayo)
Alan Norton (Gods Way Ministries – formerly River of Life)

Appendix 5 – Master list of Goods released (Reconciliation Goods released and distributed)

ZOE Relief programme 2008

| Master List of Goods Released | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | | Despatch warehouse | Item 1 | Item 2 | Item 3 | Item 4 |
| | | | Maize | Beans | Veg Oil | CSB |
| | | | Kg | Kg | litres | Kg |
| Total planned | Whole project | All warehouses | 2,100,000 | 420,000 | 157,500 | 420,000 |
| Total distributed during | TO DATE | Bulawayo | 1,142,000 | 248,870 | 62,938 | 210,600 |
| Total distributed during | TO DATE | Harare | 323,750 | 56,080 | 23,374 | 57,980 |
| Total distributed during | TO DATE | Hwange | 176,000 | 35,200 | 12,899 | 35,200 |
| Total distributed during | TO DATE | Nkayi | 210,010 | 40,077 | 13,783 | 48,482 |
| Total distributed during | TO DATE | Gwanda | 193,350 | 38,700 | 13,731 | 36,625 |
| Total distributed | TO DATE | All warehouses | 2,045,110 | 418,927 | 126,724 | 388,887 |
| Total outstanding | | All warehouses | 54,890 | 1,073 | 30,776 | 31,114 |
| % outstanding | | | 2.61 | 0.26 | 19.54 | 7.41 |
| Reasons for shortfall | | | | | | |
| Awaiting distribution | | | 49,200 | ? | | |
| Not supplied by V&N | | | | | 26,713 | |
| Oil stolen | | | | | 4,044 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Distributions during | Month | | | | | |
| | 29-Jan-08 | Bulawayo | 208,100 | 41,600 | 15,611 | 30,000 |
| | 28-Feb-08 | Bulawayo | 180,100 | 36,500 | 9,506 | 27,350 |
| | 31-Mar-08 | Bulawayo | 137,800 | 22,900 | 8,288 | 22,300 |
| | 30-Apr-08 | Bulawayo | 14,850 | 3,050 | 1,144 | 3,050 |
| | 31-May-08 | Bulawayo | 158,950 | 31,610 | 11,854 | 33,100 |
| | 30-Jun-08 | Bulawayo | 68,900 | 13,790 | 5,175 | 17,700 |
| | 30-Jul-08 | Bulawayo | 122,500 | 24,500 | 9,188 | 24,500 |
| | 31-Aug-08 | Bulawayo | 210,800 | 66,920 | 1,891 | 44,600 |
| | 30-Sep-08 | Bulawayo | 12,000 | 2,400 | 283 | 2,400 |
| | 31-Oct-08 | Bulawayo | 28,000 | 5,600 | | 5,600 |
| | Total Bulawayo | | 1,142,000 | 248,870 | 62,938 | 210,600 |
| | | | | | | |
| | 31-Jan-08 | Gwanda | 30,000 | 6,000 | 2,250 | 6,000 |
| | 28-Feb-08 | Gwanda | 8,000 | 1,600 | 600 | 1,600 |
| | 31-Mar-08 | Gwanda | 52,000 | 10,400 | 3,900 | 10,400 |
| | 30-Apr-08 | Gwanda | | 0 | | 0 |
| | 31-May-08 | Gwanda | 48,100 | 9,700 | 3,600 | 9,650 |
| | 30-Jun-08 | Gwanda | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 31-Jul-08 | Gwanda | 29,150 | 5,850 | 2,175 | 5,875 |
| | 31-Aug-08 | Gwanda | 15,350 | 3,100 | 1,206 | 3,100 |
| | | Gwanda | 10,750 | 2,050 | 0 | 0 |
| | Total Gwanda | | 193,350 | 38,700 | 13,731 | 36,625.00 |
| | | | | | | |
| | 31-Jan-08 | Harare | 24,500 | 4,900 | 937 | 4,900 |
| | 28-Feb-08 | Harare | 59,100 | 8,680 | 4,946 | 9,280 |
| | 31-Mar-08 | Harare | 47,300 | 10,840 | 3,543 | 10,840 |
| | 30-Apr-08 | Harare | 23,400 | 4,680 | 1,755 | 4,680 |
| | 31-May-08 | Harare | 12,200 | 2,400 | 906 | 2,400 |
| | 30-Jun-08 | Harare | 31,000 | 6,180 | 2,321 | 6,180 |
| | 31-Jul-08 | Harare | 59,100 | 11,900 | 4,428 | 11,800 |
| | 08-Aug-08 | Harare | 15,650 | 3,200 | 1,200 | 3,200 |

| | | | | | | |
|--|-------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 30-Sep-08 | Harare | 41,350 | 3,300 | 3,007 | 3,300 |
| | 31-Oct-08 | Harare | 10,150 | | 332 | 1,400 |
| | | Total Harare | 323,750 | 56,080 | 23,374 | 57,980 |
| | | | | | | |
| | 31-Jan-08 | Hwange | 42,550 | 8,600 | 1,607 | 8,850 |
| | 01-Feb-08 | Hwange | 17,450 | 3,400 | 0 | 3,150 |
| | | Hwange | 116,000 | 23,200 | 11,292 | 23,200 |
| | | Total Hwange | 176,000 | 35,200 | 12,899 | 35,200 |
| | | | | | | |
| | 30-Jan-08 | Nkayi | 51,500 | 10,300 | 3,821 | 10,175 |
| | 28-Feb-08 | Nkayi | 8,500 | 1,700 | 678 | 1,825 |
| | 31-Mar-08 | Nkayi | 9,360 | 1,744 | 709 | 9,245 |
| | 30-May-08 | Nkayi | 63,540 | 11,545 | 4,794 | 11,845 |
| | 31 April 08 | Nkayi | 30,000 | 6,000 | 2,250 | 6,000 |
| | 31 June 08 | Nkayi | 17,110 | 3,688 | 1,391 | 3,768 |
| | 30-Sep-08 | Nkayi | 30,000 | 5,100 | 140 | 5,625 |
| | | Total Nkayi | 210,010 | 40,077 | 13,783 | 48,481.50 |

Note – this is probably not the final, definitive document, as several questions remain.

Appendix 6 Notes on review of log frame

Several hours was spent with the team reviewing the log frame without coming to a clear consensus of what changes if any were needed. On further reflection, the evaluator took a decision to make some small changes to the objectives and indicators. A brief explanation of the rationale for the changes is given below:

Purpose: 7,000 vulnerable orphan households are protected from the negative impacts of the food crisis in Zimbabwe until the next harvest.

Indicators: None of target group show signs of malnutrition
< 2% children report having missed school in last month due to hunger
Families receiving agricultural inputs harvest enough food to last 12 months

Original Purpose: orphan households are less vulnerable to the impact of insufficient food by the end of May 2008

This was partly a clarification of the wording, but in the evaluators view, protection was a more realistic objective. While improved health and assets may have helped some rural families get a better harvest, it was felt that the 6 months food ration of itself would not address the underlying vulnerability of these families.

Output 1: 35,000 vulnerable people (orphans, their families and carers) have timely access to food that provides an adequate daily diet during the period January to July 2008

Indicators: 35,000 beneficiaries receive the full allocated ration on time each month
Beneficiary families eat at least 2 balanced meals per day (include starch, protein and fat)
U5's and the chronically ill are regularly eating CSB in at least 70% of benefiting families

Original Output – Improved access to and use of food.

The intention was to make the output statement more explicit

The first indicator was added as it was felt that this was an important 'deliverable' of the project.

Output 2: 480 orphan families are able to plant sufficient staple crops to cover their annual needs using appropriate methods

Indicators: Families receive the targeted amount of seed and fertiliser by the optimum planting date
Families plant at least 3 acres of staple food crops using the FGW approach

Original output - Improved food security for targeted rural families. This will depend on a number of factors that are outside the control of ZOE. 'Improved food security' is captured in the purpose statement